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A Proposal for an NDP-Liberal Coalition

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NDP – Liberal Coalition, An Examination

By John Ryan

Shortly after the election I wrote an article, “A chilling echo of Bush’s Republicans,” (CounterPunch, January 31), and then I sent an open letter to each NDP and Liberal MP, later published in CounterPunch, March 1. Afterwards, I wrote a personal letter to Jack Layton with additional points and nuances that I was unable to present in a joint letter to Liberals and NDP.

The purpose of this letter is to present you with some further analysis and views on the matter of forming a coalition between the NDP and the Liberals.

On March 27 Professor Jim Silver and I presented a talk to the United Jewish People’s Order. Jim spoke on how the NDP seems to operate on the basis of what their polling agents feel the public wants or reflects – rather than from a solid philosophical-economic-political platform, as in the days of the CCF or the early years of the NDP. Judy Wasylycia-Leis, an NDP MP, was there and did not challenge him on this. I presented an analysis of the 2006 election and the threat of what could happen under a majority Harper government, based on my “chilling echo” paper of January 31. I also presented the essence of my “Open Letter” argument, pointing out that to block deep integration and to stop Harper from getting a majority would require a coalition of the NDP and the Liberals. Both Jim and Judy vigorously disagreed with me, but when I pressed them on it, neither one of them could explain how Harper or the deep integration project could be stopped, other than through a coalition.

The day after our talk I wrote letters to both Jim and Judy, further explaining my position and challenging them to refute my analysis. Judy has not responded, in the way that Jack Layton did not respond (other than an acknowledgement from his office), but Jim did write me a thoughtful letter, to which I wrote a further reply. At least Jim and I are now engaged in a dialogue, and it’s been helpful in thinking through this complex situation we find ourselves in. In addition to this I have been exchanging opinions and views, by phone and email, with Ed Schreyer and journalist Frances Russell, and with a few of my friends and colleagues.

With respect to the 132 letters I wrote to the MPs, I’ve only had two responses – one was an acknowledgement of receipt from an assistant to an NDP MP and the other was a letter from an NDP MP’s assistant who completely misread my letter and berated me for advocating the dissolution of the NDP. On the other hand, by contrast, the response from the public to my published “open letter” article was significantly different. I’ve now received almost a 100 letters from all parts of the country, with three-quarters of them being highly supportive of the idea of a coalition.

Since I wrote my analysis of the 2006 election (the “chilling echo” article) on January 31, my thoughts and views have evolved and changed. This led to the “Open Letter” on March 1, but unfortunately I rushed it and consequently it contains a major flaw. If I had only left it on my desk for a few days I’m sure this would have become evident to me. But the damage is done and now all I can do is some “damage control.” Without thinking it through fully, I mentioned the word “merger.” It was done rather innocently. Initially it seemed to me that if a coalition should work out favourably, over a period of time, if both parties could agree to a progressive, meaningful platform they might then consider a merger. Mulling this over, it suddenly dawned on me that this was totally wrong. Under no circumstances should the NDP ever consider a merger with the Liberals – this would deny Canadians the possibility of an avenue for introducing new progressive, even socialist measures.

Jim Silver is of the opinion that European coalitions are somehow not relevant to Canada. I disagree with this. If we are to consider a coalition proposal in Canada, we should carefully study the European experience, and then use that as a model, adapted to Canadian conditions. We don’t have to reinvent the wheel! The main difference for us at present is that I am advocating a coalition before the next election to stop Harper from getting a majority. A Conservative majority in one term of office could carry out most of its agenda and do irreparable harm to Canada’s social and economic fabric. This poses an unprecedented danger to our country – and in the national interest the NDP and the Liberals should form a coalition to prevent this from happening. Essentially this calls for a temporary coalition – one whose duration would be determined by circumstances as they evolve.

My view of a desirable model would be that both parties would retain their individual identities, even while in a coalition government. Their commonality would be the platform planks on which they agree, but there would be no necessity to agree on everything – and some of their differences could be quite basic. The differences would simply be matters that would not become issues during the period of coalition. All parties do this at the moment – they all have certain things in their platforms that they choose not to make major issues. Certainly the NDP has done this over the years. Consider all the resolutions that are adopted at conventions – but which never come up in an actual election platform. So this is no big deal in the matter of a coalition. For instance, as part of its raison d’etre, the NDP could have various socialist objectives — providing they would dare to include this! They sure as hell don’t at the moment. But there would be nothing to stop them from having this in their own platform – these would just be features that the Liberals and the NDP would not agree on to be part of their joint platform.

To my mind, if they agree to a coalition, the joint platform would be matters that they agree on, but this should not stop the parties from including other measures during an election which would be clearly identified as being solely an NDP feature or a Liberal feature by their candidates. Also during their conventions each party could adopt resolutions to become part of their individual platforms. And then these resolutions, measures, or “planks” could be negotiated to see if they could become agreeable to both parties in a joint platform. This is why it is critical that the NDP should never merge with the Liberals. As an independent party, they could serve as a vanguard to introduce further progressive (or even “socialist”!) measures for consideration in a joint platform. Frankly, I don’t know how practical this would be during a coalition period, but it is something that would be desirable.

If the NDP and the Liberals were to consider a coalition it can be argued that the NDP has considerably more bargaining power than is reflected in their electoral support or in the number of elected MPs. As a result of the last election the Liberals have been weakened in a number of respects.

• - Being reduced to opposition status and being leaderless until December has put the party in considerable disarray.
• - Their government record is seriously blemished, eg., the gun registry fiasco, the Gomery inquiry scandal, poor election strategy
• - Their electoral base in Quebec has been seriously undermined, by both the Bloc Quebecois and the recent Conservative resurgence – Liberals are now in 3rd place
• - Liberal support in Ontario has eroded and it’s at rock bottom in the West
• - They don’t appear to have any philosophical or practical policies as a platform
• - With the political right now unified, complete with support from both the corporate sector and the media, and with a resurgent NDP under a reasonably competent leader, the Liberal prospects of ever getting a majority government are dismal – even a minority would be problematic at present – unless they should get a charismatic leader who might resurrect their party
• - At present, for good reason the party is demoralized and in a state of flux and disarray

For these reasons, the Liberal party is obviously weakened and vulnerable. With some ingenuity and imagination, the NDP could have considerable bargaining power if it wanted to negotiate a coalition with the Liberals.

Both Jim Silver and Judy Wasylycia-Leis took the position that if the NDP formed a coalition with the Liberals, there was the prospect that the party could somehow self-destruct and that this could lead to the American situation of creating two wings of virtually the same party – and with the NDP being totally off the scene. I countered that they simply didn’t understand what was meant by a coalition. In fact, it can be argued that the NDP would be strengthened, both during and after a possible coalition. Let me cite a section from my “Open Letter”:

In a coalition, both parties would retain their individual identities, but would have to agree on a common platform or agenda, not necessarily on all matters, but on some basic, fundamental issues. They would also have to agree on an election strategy . . . The strategy should be a straightforward matter, and once agreed upon, it could be the driving force to hammer out a platform, and thereby create a coalition.

A meaningful strategy, equally in the interest of both parties, would be an agreement to run all the incumbent candidates, Liberal and NDP, without opposition from the other party. Such a strategy would guarantee the reelection of every single member–surely this should be an enticement for a coalition! As for the seats held by the Conservatives, party strategists should be able to work out which party would have a better chance of winning, and then run just one candidate for that particular party. Such a maneuver would wipe out a great many Conservatives everywhere . . . [and] this would be a winning formula for a majority coalition government.

Obviously, from such a venture the NDP would wind up with an increased number of seats. Moreover, in a formal coalition they would have some of their members in the cabinet of a coalition government. This would be the first time that the NDP would be in such a situation. This would give the NDP some additional stature with the general public. How could an increased number of seats and cabinet experience somehow destroy the NDP? And in the course of government, if the NDP discovered bad faith on the part of the Liberals, they would have the right to leave the coalition — and in a much stronger position than ever before.

This is what happens in European coalitions – parties don’t get destroyed by taking part in coalitions. As for the argument that what we need is proportional representation rather than a coalition, this is patent nonsense because at this stage we don’t have the luxury of time for that. All the Harper Conservatives need is ONE term in office to carry out their agenda. After that the NDP could enjoy rearranging deckchairs on the Titanic . . . and getting proportional representation in the next generation . . . when we’ll all be happy little Americans. This is not something that we can just muddle through. Countries sometimes actually get destroyed . . . there’s Yugoslavia for a reminder.

Moreover, in my opinion, about the only way the NDP might get proportional representation adopted is through a coalition with the Liberals. It could be a bargaining point for the NDP to enter a coalition with them. I can’t see how the NDP could do this on their own, unless they should form a majority government, and when is that going to be? Furthermore, if proportional representation is introduced, it may very well eliminate any chance of a single party forming a majority government. And so coalitions would be the order of the day. If the NDP wants proportional representation, the flip side of that is being prepared to enter coalitions.

A combined NDP-Liberal platform would be a matter of negotiation. The NDP would not have to come into this from a position of weakness. The Liberals need the NDP if they are ever to get back in a governing position. And in the same way, if the NDP wants to have a role in government (rather than perpetual opposition as a 3rd party) they need the Liberals.

Any cooperation of the NDP with the Liberals would have to be on the basis of a European type coalition, or some type of alliance, in which both parties would retain their own identities – so that they’d be in a position to walk away from the arrangement, if something came up that undermined the relationship.

At the basis of any coalition there would have to be an agreement on a key number of planks in a joint platform. As in European coalitions, they would not have to agree on everything – just on a sufficient number to make the venture worthwhile. Frankly, right now only two factors would make it worthwhile – to kill the “deep integration” proposal and to stop Harper from getting a majority government. These two measures in themselves would be more than sufficient to form a coalition. Aside from this, I think there are a number of issues on which they shouldn’t have too much difficulty. Let me list these first:

• - Medicare. But the NDP should dig in its heels that this would have to exclude federal funding, directly and indirectly, for all private hospitals/clinics and any type of two-tier health care system.
• - A proper childcare program, perhaps using Quebec as a model.
• - A pharmacare program, eventually leading to the nationalization of Big Pharma
• - A substantial expansion of funding for the CBC.
• - The retention and strengthening of the Canadian Wheat Board.

There are three other issues that should be almost non-negotiable matters:

• - The introduction of legislation for proportional representation.
• - The complete rejection of any type of “deep integration” proposals.
• - The abrogation of NAFTA. But first of all the NDP itself would have to be convinced of this!

If the NDP and Liberals could agree on such a joint platform, why shouldn’t they form a coalition? On their own, at this stage, neither one of them could accomplish any of this.

Having said all this, I realize that there is a critical weakness to my argument. And the weakness exists in both the Liberals and the NDP. For whatever reason, there may be an insufficient number of NDPers who would be prepared to enter a coalition with the Liberals. If that’s the case, there is no prospect for a coalition. On the other hand, there’s the strong likelihood that there aren’t enough left-leaning Liberals to sway the Liberal party to consider a coalition. If indeed the bulk of them are right wing reactionaries, not much different from the Harper crowd, what could possibly be the common ground for a coalition? If that’s the case, the prospects for Canada’s survival are pretty slim. Both Jim and Judy insisted that there are NO left-leaning Liberals. How they can be so categorically certain is beyond me. For one thing, as I understand it, Paul Martin and his right wing cabinet were fully prepared to adopt the anti-missile defence system, but what stopped them was a sizeable number of backbenchers who refused to endorse this. Without them, the NDP and the Bloc couldn’t have stopped the Liberals and Conservatives from carrying this out. Also it was the backbenchers who made sure that Chretien wouldn’t support Bush in the Iraq war. I consider these to be left-leaning Liberals who could be convinced to enter a coalition with the NDP.

A further matter that should be considered is that there is a strong likelihood that there is a qualitative difference between Conservatives and Liberals, in that most of the current crop of Conservatives are ideologues, compared to many Liberals who are simply political opportunists. Undoubtedly the upper echelon of the Liberals are corporate ideologues comparable to the Conservatives, eg., David Emerson, but many of the ordinary MPs may be opportunists, first and foremost. Being suddenly relegated into the ranks of the opposition must be particularly demoralizing for them. Instead of being arrogantly in power as they were when in government, they aren’t that far off from the guy who on discovering he’s about to be hanged in a few days also discovers that this “concentrates his mind wonderfully” (with apologies to Samuel Johnson).

While in this demoralized and vulnerable position, a sizeable number of Liberals may be prepared to listen to an offer from the NDP if they could see some tangible benefit to them. If they were offered a formal coalition, combined with the election strategy that I have outlined, they would have an immediate vested interest because they would not only all be reelected, they would once again be in government after the next election. Being opportunists, it may not trouble them all that much that they might have to support a progressive platform and shift to the left in alliance with the NDP. Once you’d get a few of them on side, it may be possible to shift the bulk of the party, except of course for the dyed-in-the-wool corporate right wing, many of whom might then jump ship and join the Conservatives. There is always the prospect, of course, that the real power brokers of the Liberal party (whoever they are) would whip the wayward Liberal MPs back into line. Aside from the Darth Vader power brokers, whether or not any of this would happen, would depend on the ingenuity and imagination of the NDP in such a venture.

At the very basis of all this will be the NDP’s decision on the idea of a coalition. It seems to me that many in the party don’t recall when it was that the NDP made significant advances in Parliament, and in ensuing legislation. These were during periods of coalition with the Liberals! (albeit tacit rather than formal). During 1972-74, in return for the NDP’s support during a Liberal minority government, Pierre Trudeau introduced a two-price oil policy which for the next ten years was of enormous benefit to Canadians. This was done in the face of viciously hostile American opposition when they called us the “blue-eyed Arabs.” Trudeau with NDP support held his ground – it’s rare for Canadians to have such moments. It was during this period that David Lewis convinced Trudeau to create Petro-Canada, and to nationalize several small companies to serve as its base. Plans were also made for further nationalization to give Canada 50 percent ownership of our oil resources by 1990. During this time FIRA was created (the Foreign Investment Review Agency) to stop some of the foreign takeovers. Of course Mulroney killed all of this. However, without a tacit coalition, none of this would have happened.

And last year how did the NDP convince the Liberals to put in a few more billion into social services programs? – through a tacit coalition. The NDP also prevailed on the Liberals to start up a childcare program, but before it was fully activated, the NDP inexplicably decided to defeat the government last fall. But that and the conduct of the election campaign is another story which I have expounded on elsewhere.

With the Liberals being in a state of flux and disarray, the NDP has an opportunity to help shape the very nature of the direction of this party. Since the days of Trudeau the upper echelon of the party has been consistently shifting the Liberals to the right. And now with a Conservative victory the leadership may try to emulate the Conservative success by moving further to the right. As I said in my open letter, without intervention from the NDP at this critical juncture, we could see a repetition of the American experience where the Democrats have morphed into a Republican-lite caricature. Then we would wind up with two wings of virtually the same party – exactly as in the USA. And then where would the NDP be with its 20 to 30 seats against two almost identical continentalist and capitalist parties? This would be a nightmare for the country.

If the NDP were to offer to form a coalition with the Liberals, it would give the Liberal rank and file an option to the almost inexorable continuing shift further and further to the right. If the coalition move were to be successful, in time, it could likely create a centrist or moderate Liberal party, not dominated by the right wing. The flip side of this is that if the NDP doesn’t try to intervene, the Liberals in all likelihood would become a carbon copy of the Conservatives.

In essence, if a coalition were to ever evolve, the NDP would have to be convinced of the desirability of such a course of action. Given its recent track record, the prospects appear rather dismal. After all, the fact that Harper acquired a minority government and is poised to form a majority is largely the work of the NDP. Not nice to say, but the facts are hard to refute. The rationale for defeating the Liberal government in the fall of 2005 appears contrived and far from convincing. Paul Martin had pledged to hold an election a month after the release of the final Gomery report on February 1. A mid-November nationwide survey showed that 57 percent of Canadians preferred a spring election because “there’s a lot of important work that still needs to be done.” But because of the precipitous drop in Liberal support following the release of the preliminary Gomery report on November 1, Stephen Harper wanted an election as soon as possible. The NDP could have used the three months or more to try to complete the childcare program and the aboriginal settlement – instead of leaving them unfinished and subject to attack by Harper. In addition, there could have been other measures, such as pharmacare (even the proposal to nationalize Big Pharma), that they could have pursued during this time. On the other hand, Harper felt that the most opportune time for the Conservatives to make gains was before the final Gomery report came out – so why did the NDP decide to ignore public opinion and accommodate Harper in this manner, and at the same time sacrifice possible legislative gains for the Canadian people? Was it because Layton’s advisors told him that if he continued to work with the Liberals that this might tarnish the NDP once the final Gomery report came out?

The concerns of the party seem to trump the national interest. I have dealt with the highly dubious strategy of the election campaign in my previous two papers. Over all, to the consternation of many of us on the left, the campaign gave every appearance of Layton’s wish for a Conservative government – minority or majority didn’t seem to matter.

In my article “A chilling echo of Bush’s Republicans” I presented the specific dangers that Canada would face if the Conservatives managed to get a majority government, and in the “Open Letter” article I dealt with the problem of preventing a Conservative majority and the devastating features of the “deep integration” proposal. I also dealt with the urgent necessity of abrogating NAFTA – to enable us to have a national energy policy, to get security of energy supply, and to enable us to shift our trade to the rest of the world rather than just rely on the USA. Somehow these are not at the top of the NDP’s agenda, where they should be. The NDP apparently doesn’t have a policy on NAFTA. The evidence is there! What’s the NDP waiting for? Also a recent survey has shown that half the Canadians polled would support the nationalization of the oil and gas industry. Where’s the NDP on this? And what about “deep integration”?

A Google search indicates the NDP raised this issue, briefly and ineptly, on only three occasions in 2005, and, astoundingly, there isn’t even a mention of it in the NDP’s 2006 election platform. From what I can determine, it never came up throughout the entire campaign, and certainly not during the leaders’ debates. If Jack Layton was so determined to destroy the Liberals, why didn’t he launch a nuclear-tipped “deep integration” torpedo at the “smoking burned out hulk” of the Liberal party? Or has all this been deliberately avoided because Layton and the NDP are simply afraid to mention the abrogation of NAFTA and the folly of “deep integration” for fear that the NDP could then be accused of being “anti-American”? If the NDP won’t speak up for Canada’s interests, who will – the continentalist Liberal-Conservatives? And to have conducted their election campaign in such a manner that it resulted in a Harper government shows that the NDP does not understand or believe the grave danger that Canada would face under a majority Conservative government.

By way of conclusion, if by some stroke of good fortune, the NDP could be convinced that a coalition with the Liberals would be in Canada’s best interests (and their own), how should they approach the Liberals on this? It seems to me the idea of a coalition could only be sold to the Liberals by informal talks with individual members. But before they could approach the Liberals, the NDP MPs would have to get educated themselves about the danger to Canada of a majority Conservative government, the necessity and the reasons for abrogating NAFTA, and about the real meaning and the full extent, nature, and danger to Canada of the “deep integration” proposal. Once fully versed in this, the NDP MPs would be in a position to explain to Liberals why all these matters and issues should be of interest and concern to them, and why it’s necessary to rise above partisan party politics if we are to act in the best interests of Canada.

Actually, the facts on all these issues are crystal clear, and Liberals who aren’t tied in to the corporate world might be swayed, especially if they have a genuine concern for Canada. For one thing, it is reasonably certain that Paul Martin did not brief the Liberal caucus on the details of the diabolical “deep integration” project. If he had done this he might have had a revolt from the backbenchers, as he did with missile defence. Who in his or her right mind would want to turn Canada over to the USA as an abject colony – no better than Puerto Rico? But that’s exactly what would happen to us with this treaty – it’s only the major conglomerates and their supporters who would want this. Handled properly, with intelligence and ingenuity, there’s a good prospect that a coalition could be forged.

Years ago when I retired, I told my students that the way things were going, long before they reached my age, they might be voting for an American president. It is this thought that was behind the writing of my “open letter,” and this letter to you now. From the perspective of many of us on the left, we feel that conditions are such that if the NDP acts with intelligence and courage, they may be in a position to change the course of history for Canada.

[based on a letter to an NDP MP, April 4, 2006]

John Ryan, Ph.D. is a retired professor of geography and senior scholar at the University of Winnipeg.

@ April 17, 2006