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Northeast African States Demand Greater Share of Nile River Water

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A latent conflict over the distribution of water from the Nile River has been unfolding in Northeast Africa for several years.


This conflict could very well add to the already existing tension in the
region. Insufficient rainfall, widespread famine, rapid population
growth, and the desire for economic development have made the downstream
of water a contentious issue among the riparian states.

On the core of the emerging conflict lies a 1959 treaty between Egypt
and Sudan — excluding all other riparian states — that regulates the
distribution of water from the Nile among the two signature powers; the
treaty has disproportionately favored Egypt, which was, at the time, the
hegemonic power in Northeast Africa. Other African states have, however,
developed their economies in recent years and face high population
growth levels. These developments have led them to demand a greater
share of Nile River water.

While other countries face similar challenges, Ethiopia has been the
major protagonist in challenging the Egyptian position. Eight-five
percent of the Nile water passing through Egypt comes from the
famine-ridden country of Ethiopia. Egypt has so far maintained that any
unilateral action to make use of Nile River water would be regarded as a
breach of international law and has even threatened to go to war should
Ethiopia take further steps without first consulting Cairo.

Ethiopia, the most populous country in the Horn of Africa, needs to
develop its irrigation system to end the decades-long dependency on
foreign food relief; at the same time, however, Egypt’s population is
growing rapidly, increasing water demand. Moreover, roughly 95 percent
of Egypt’s territory is inhospitable desert. Cairo has even built new
cities for its growing population, projects that require even more
water. Both countries are striving to develop their economies and to
feed their populations, while climactic changes are making droughts more
widespread.

The distribution of Nile River water has been regulated by the 1929 Blue
Nile agreement between the United Kingdom and Egypt, and the 1959
agreement between Sudan and Egypt. The latter gave Cairo a de facto
right to veto any project using Nile water in other riparian states.
Although this treaty remained unchallenged over the years, this is no
longer the case. Indeed, many African states have experienced robust
G.D.P. growth rates in recent years — with the notable exception of
Eritrea, which suffers immensely due to its border war with Ethiopia and
its devastating economic policy of self-reliance — and this has
increased their need to develop their infrastructure, produce more
energy, and provide more water to their populations. Understandably, the
majority of the Nile River countries now want to renegotiate the
decades-old treaties.

Sudan, currently improving its position as a result of high oil prices
and substantial oil exports, also demands a greater share of Nile River
water. In August 1995, Khartoum threatened to withdraw from the 1959
treaty on the grounds that it was unable to use the Nile water as needed
to develop its economy. Thus far, Khartoum has refrained from
withdrawing from the agreement, but the 2011 referendum on independence
for the south of the country would make renegotiation inevitable if the
referendum is in fact being held, something Cairo is strongly opposed
to. [See: "Intelligence Brief: New Peace Deal in Sudan Unlikely to End Darfur Conflict"]

Other Nile basin countries have also developed a greater interest in
Nile River water. Uganda would like to use more water for the production
of hydroelectric power, and Tanzania wants to extract water from Lake
Victoria, one of the sources of the Nile, in a US$27.6 billion project
to pipe water to development areas in the east.

The conflict has already led to setbacks in the peace processes in the
broader Horn of Africa region. Conflict resolution efforts in Somalia
failed several times when Cairo felt its interests were not taken into
account. Egypt supported the 2000 Arta Conference in Djibouti aimed at
restoring peace in war-torn Somalia in what led to the formation of the
Transitional National Government. While partially successful in
concluding a power-sharing deal among Somali warlords, Ethiopia felt
that the transitional government was infiltrated by radical Islamists
belonging to al-Ittihad al-Islami and withdrew from the process, while
Egypt supported the process with the aim of re-establishing Somalia as a
counterweight to Ethiopian influence.

After the Arta process failed, a new effort for Somali reconciliation
was undertaken by Kenya under the auspices of I.G.A.D. in 2002. The
process reached a climax with the formation of the Transitional Federal
Government (T.F.G.) in late 2004 and its relocation to Somalia in July
2005. The TFG became isolated after Islamists achieved a stunning
victory in Mogadishu in June 2006 and restored some form of law and
order in the capital. This time, it seems, Arab countries did not
actively support the initiative in what they perceived was an Ethiopian
and Kenyan dominated effort. [See: "The Islamic Courts Union Opens a New Chapter in Somalia's Political History"]

With an unresolved border conflict with Eritrea in the east and a Somali
uprising in the Ogaden region in the south, the Egyptian government
assumed that Addis Ababa would not want to provoke Cairo over the water
issue. However, Ethiopia’s large population and its impressive G.D.P.
growth rate have made Addis Ababa recognize that economic development is
increasingly tied to its ability to use its natural resources, and the
Nile water system is in that sense perhaps its most important asset.

Under the framework of the Nile Basin Initiative, all Nile basin
countries — the Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda,
Sudan, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Tanzania — are now discussing
changes in the 1959 agreement on a rather professional basis. The number
of involved countries and their often contradicting interests are making
the success of these talks highly unlikely. While the population of
these countries is expected to double within the next three decades,
Nile water is becoming scarcer than ever.

Egypt, Yemen, Sudan, and Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, are playing a
rather less aggressive role in the politics in the Horn of Africa since
the September 11 attacks, realizing that the United States is becoming
more interested in the region in an effort to contain radical Islamists.
At this time, prospects for a new deal on the distribution of Nile River
water are plagued with uncertainty.
Report Drafted By:
Dustin Dehéz

@ September 27, 2006

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